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Abstract: Problem statement: In peer-to-peer networks, Byzantine fault tolerance refers to the 
capability of a system to tolerate Byzantine faults. It can be achieved by replicating the server and by 
ensuring all server replicas reach an agreement on the input despite Byzantine faulty replicas and 
clients. Since malicious attacks and software errors can cause faulty nodes to exhibit Byzantine 
behavior, Byzantine-fault-tolerant algorithms are increasingly important. Approach: In the study, we 
wish to develop a robust Byzantine Fault-Tolerance Replication (BFTR) technique for peer-to-peer 
content distribution systems which contains fault detection and fault recovery. It is based on 
collaborative monitoring of each node to detect the occurrence of a fault. Already we proposed a QoS 
based overlay network architecture (QIRM) involving an intelligent replica placement algorithm to 
improve the network utilization of the P2P system. Results: By simulation results, we show that the 
proposed technique involves less overhead and recovery time with increased accuracy. 
Conclusion/Recommendations: Here the result obtained is that BFTR Technique is much efficient 
than the QIRM with respect to packet drop ratio, average end-to-end delay, throughput and overhead. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  A peer-to-peer, commonly abbreviated to P2P, is 
any distributed network architecture composed of 
participants that make a portion of their resources such 
as processing power, disk storage or network bandwidth 
directly available to other network participants, without 
the need for central coordination instances such as 
servers or stable hosts. Peers are both suppliers and 
consumers of resources, in contrast to the traditional 
client-server model where only servers supply and 
clients consume. Peer-to-peer systems often implement 
an Application Layer overlay network on top of the 
native or physical network topology. Such overlays are 
used for indexing and peer discovery. Content is 
typically exchanged directly over the underlying 
Internet Protocol (IP) network 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byzantine_fault_tolerance 
). Anonymous peer-to-peer systems are an exception 
and implement extra routing layers to obscure the 
identity of the source or destination of queries. 
  Fault detection is a subfield of control engineering 
which concerns itself with monitoring a system, 
identifying the fault when it occurs and pinpoint the 
type of fault and its location (Simon, 2009). If the 
detector determines that some node has become faulty, 
it notifies the application software, which can then take 
appropriate action. For example, nodes can cease to 
communicate with the faulty node; once all correct 
nodes have followed suit, the faulty node is isolated and 
the fault is contained. 
  Fault detection is insufficient for dealing with 
faults that have serious and irreversible effects, such as 
deletion of all copies of an important document. 
However, detection may offer an efficient and scalable 
alternative to Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) for 
faults that have limited or recoverable effects, including 
freeloading, censorship and denial-of-service. Using 
fault detectors, each action is undeniably associated 
with the identification of the node that has performed 
the action, allowing the system to gather irrefutable 
evidence of faulty behavior. The fault detection systems 
we consider should guarantee at least two properties. 
The system should be complete: whenever a correct 
node observes the effects of faulty behavior, the system J. Computer Sci., 7 (2): 159-166, 2011 
 
160 
eventually generates evidence against at least one faulty 
node. Also, the system should be accurate: it never 
generates valid evidence against a correct node (Petr 
and Druschel, 2006). 
 
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT):  In a distributed 
system, an arbitrary fault occurs during the execution of 
an algorithm which is known as the Byzantine fault. 
Both omission failures like crash failures, failing to 
receive a request, or failing to send a response and 
commission failures like processing a request 
incorrectly, corrupting local state and/or sending an 
incorrect or inconsistent response to a request are 
included in the Byzantine fault (Petr and Druschel, 
2006). The potential of a system to tolerate Byzantine 
faults is the Byzantine fault tolerance. By replicating 
the server and ensuring all server replicas reach an 
agreement on the input in spite of Byzantine faulty 
replicas, Byzantine fault tolerance can be achieved. 
This agreement is known as Byzantine agreement 
(Zhao, 2007). Importance of Byzantine-fault-tolerance 
algorithms is increasing since faulty nodes are caused 
by malicious attacks and software errors which can 
exhibit Byzantine behavior (Castro and Liskov, 1999).  
  Though some part of replicas fail, a service 
replicated over several BFT servers are able to survive 
and so affecting an overall application security has a 
very small probability. BFT replication can be protected 
against malicious or incompetent machine operators, 
only when replicas are separately administered.  
  Linearizability and liveness  are the two main 
properties of BFT protocols. In Linearizability, the 
service appears to all clients for executing a sequence 
of requests which preserves the temporal order of non-
concurrent operations. Improvement in executing 
client’s requests in a system with at-least some weak 
assumption about eventual message delivery is known 
as Liveness (Li and Mazieres, 2007). As more faults are 
tolerated, the performance of the Byzantine fault-
tolerant agreement-based approaches drops rapidly due 
to server-to-server broadcast communication and the 
requirement that all correct servers process every 
request (El Malek et al., 2005). 
  Byzantine fault tolerant replication scheme must 
meet the following objectives: 
 
•  Ensure that all non-faulty replicas have equivalent 
logical state such that they will return the same 
answer to any given query 
•  Ensure that the client always gets correct answers 
to queries belonging to transactions that commit, 
even when up to f replicas are faulty 
•  Detect faulty replicas and flag them for repair 
 
Proposed work: We wish to develop a fault-tolerance 
replication technique for peer-to-peer content 
distribution systems which contains fault detection and 
fault recovery. It is the extension of our previous study 
(Ayyasamy and Sivanandam, 2009) which presents a 
QoS based intelligent replica placement algorithm.
  Two fundamental classes of replication techniques 
ensure linearizability: primary-backup and active.  
  This primary Back-up Replication technique uses 
one replica, the primary that plays a special role: it 
receives invocations from client processes and returns 
responses. Server x’s primary replica is denoted 
prim(x); other replicas are backups. Backups interact 
directly only with the primary replica, not the client 
processes.  
  The proposed technique involve less overhead and 
recovery time with increased accuracy. It is based on 
collaborative monitoring of each node to detect the 
occurrence of a fault. 
 
Related work:  Clement  et al. (2009) have describe 
Aardvark, a new BFT replication protocol that 
guarantees good performance during uncivil periods, 
when the network is reliable but when up to f servers 
and any number of clients are faulty. Aardvark gives up 
some performance compared to protocols that focus on 
optimizing for the best case, but Aardvark’s peak 
throughput of 40527 requests per second seems 
sufficient for many applications. Because Aardvark is 
less aggressively tuned for the fault free case, it is 
guaranteed to remain within a constant factor of 40527 
when faults occur. 
  Zhijun and Minghong (2005) Evolutionary Overlay 
Service in Peer-to-Peer Systems can evolve the 
overlays based on many factors, such as peers’ 
reliability; peers’ capacity; peers’ ability to judge the 
correctness of the information, etc. The evolved 
overlay can improve the system performance, which is 
proved by theoretical analysis and verified by 
experimental results. 
 Amir  et al. (2010) have presented the first 
hierarchical Byzantine fault-tolerant replication 
architecture suitable to systems that span multiple wide 
area sites. The architecture confines the effects of any 
malicious replica to its local site, reduces message 
complexity of wide area communication and allows 
read-only queries to be performed locally within a site 
for the price of additional hardware. A prototype 
implementation is evaluated over several network 
topologies and is compared with a flat Byzantine fault-
tolerant approach. J. Computer Sci., 7 (2): 159-166, 2011 
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 Kotla  et al. (2007) have presented Zyzzyva, a 
protocol that uses speculation to re-duce the cost and 
simplify the design of Byzantine fault tolerant state 
machine replication. In Zyzzyva, replicas respond to a 
client’s request without first running an expensive 
three-phase commit protocol to reach agreement on the 
order in which the request must be processed. Instead, 
they optimistically adopt the order proposed by the 
primary and respond immediately to the client. Replicas 
can thus be-come temporarily inconsistent with one 
another, but clients detect inconsistencies, help correct 
replicas converge on a single total ordering of requests 
and only rely on responses that are consistent with this 
total order. 
  Pathak and Iftode (2006) have described Byzantine 
Fault Tolerant Authentication, a mechanism for public 
key authentication in peer-to-peer systems. 
Authentication done without trusted third parties, 
tolerates Byzantine faults and is eventually correct if 
more than a threshold of the peers is honest. They 
addressed the design, correctness and fault tolerance 
of authentication over insecure asynchronous 
networks. An anti-entropy version of the protocol is 
developed to provide lazy authentication with 
logarithmic messaging cost. 
 Singh  et al. (2009) have presented a novel BFT 
state machine replication protocol called Zeno that 
trades consistency for higher availability. In particular, 
Zeno replaces strong consistency (linearizability) with a 
weaker guarantee (eventual consistency): clients can 
temporarily miss each other’s updates but when the 
network is stable the states from the individual 
partitions are merged by having the replicas agree on a 
total order for all requests. 
  Ayyasamy and Sivanandam (2010a) have proposed 
a cluster based replication architecture for load-
balancing in peer-to-peer content distribution systems. 
In addition to an intelligent replica placement 
technique, it also consists of an effective load balancing 
technique. In the intelligent replica placement 
technique, peers are grouped into strong and weak 
clusters based on their weight vector which comprises 
available capacity, CPU speed, access latency and 
memory size. In order to achieve complete load 
balancing across the system, an intra-cluster and inter-
cluster load balancing algorithms are proposed. 
  Ayyasamy and Sivanandam (2010b) have 
presented a trust based content distribution for peer-to-
peer overlay networks, which is built on the trust 
management scheme. The main concept is, before 
sending or accepting the traffic, the trust of the peer 
must be validated. Based on the success of data delivery 
and searching time, they calculated the trust index of a 
node. Then the aggregated trust index of the peers 
whose value is below the threshold value is considered 
as distrusted and the corresponding traffic is blocked. 
 
Previous work on replica placement: 
System model and overview: In our QOS aware 
topology, nodes are grouped into strong and weak 
clusters based on their weight vector which comprises 
the following parameters: 
 
•  Available capacity 
•  CPU speed 
•  Memory size 
•  Access Latency 
 
  In the replica placement algorithm, we classify the 
content as Class I and Class II, based on their access 
patterns. (i.e.,) The most frequently accessed contents 
are ranked as Class I and the less frequently accessed 
contents as Class II. Then more copies of Class I 
content are replicated in strong clusters (having high 
weight values) (Ayyasamy and Sivanandam, 2009). 
Routing is performed hierarchically by broadcasting the 
query only to the strong clusters. Thus the proposed 
architecture achieved Low bandwidth Consumption, 
Reduced Latency, Reduced Maintenance Cost, Strong 
Connectivity and Query Coverage. 
  Let us consider a collection of N server nodes 
which forms a Peer to Peer (P2P) overlay network. In 
addition to being part of the overlay, each node 
functions as a server responding to requests (queries) 
which come from clients outside of the overlay 
network. An example could be that each node is a web 
server with the overlay linking the servers and clients 
being web browsers on remote machines requesting 
content from the servers. 
  We assume each node always stores one copy of its 
own content item which it serves to clients and that it 
has additional storage space to store k replicated 
content items from other nodes which it can also serve 
(Hales et al., 2007). The object is associated with an 
authoritative Origin Server (OS) in the network where 
the content provider makes the updates to the object. 
The object copy located at the origin server is called as 
origin copy and the object copy at any remaining server 
is called a replica. 
 
Intelligent replica placement algorithm: 
Clustering the node: 
 
i For each node   N , i 1,2.......n,  let =    
 
Where: 
BWi  = Available bandwidth  
SPi  = CPU  speed 
ALi  = Access  latency 
MZi  = Memory  size J. Computer Sci., 7 (2): 159-166, 2011 
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  The weight of the node Ni can be calculated as: 
 
ii i
i
i
(BW SP MZ ) W AL
++ =  
 
  Form the vector W = {Si, Wi}, which denotes the 
node ids and their corresponding weight values, sorted 
on the descending order. 
  Let {Sk} denote the set of strong cluster nodes 
(0<=k<n), which satisfies the following condition Wk≥β, 
where β is the minimum threshold value for the weight. 
  Then the set {Wj} = {Ni} – {Sk}, denote the set of 
weak cluster nodes (0<=j<n), which satisfies the 
condition Wk<β. 
 
Replica placement: Let QS be the query server which 
registers the query of each client. The query server 
stores the cluster information of each node along with 
the node id as “S” or “W” for strong and weak clusters, 
respectively: 
 
•  At time Tk, let m clients generates query requests 
{Qm} of the form q{nid, ckwd}, where nid is the 
node id of the client and ckwd is the keyword of 
the content to be retrieved 
•  The queries {Qm} are registered in the query 
server QS 
•  The requested content of the queries are classified 
and categorized as Class 1 or Class 2, depending 
on the access frequencies: 
(i.e.) A query Qj, j<m, is considered to be Class 1  
If n (Qj) >= Amin and Class 2, 
  If n (Qj) < Amin  
Where: 
n(Qj)  =  The no. of access of the content pattern 
for the given query  
Amin  =  The minimum access threshold value 
•  Then the query server QS assigns the class1 
contents to the strong cluster nodes and class2 
contents to the weak cluster nodes 
•  After the assignment, QS transmit these replication 
pattern information to the origin server OS 
•  OS performs the replication placement, according 
to the pattern information obtained from QS. The 
weight value Wi of each node is stored along with 
the content 
•  OS then broadcasts the replication information to 
the respective clients in the following format: 
 
{Nid, Clid (“S” or “W”), c1, c2 …} 
 
Where: 
Nid =  The  node  id 
Clid   = The  cluster  id  and  c1,  c2,  are content 
database ids 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
Byzantine Fault Tolerance Replication (BFTR) 
Technique: 
Architecture model: In our proposed System, clients 
do not interact directly with the database replicas. 
Instead they communicate with the agent, which acts as 
a front-end to the replicas and coordinates them. The 
agent is replicated for increased fault tolerance. The 
following Fig.1 shows the agent system architecture. 
The architecture requires 2n + 1 database replicas, 
where n is the maximum number of simultaneously 
faulty replicas the system can tolerate. It requires only 
2n + 1 replica because the database replicas do not 
carry out agreement; instead they simply execute 
statements sent to them by the agents. The Fig.1 
illustrates a system in which n = 1. 
  We assume that the agent itself is trusted and does not 
have Byzantine faults, though it might crash. Since the 
complexity and amount of code in the agent is orders of 
magnitude smaller than in the replicas, we believe that 
assuming non-Byzantine behavior is reasonable. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Architecture 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Basic Design J. Computer Sci., 7 (2): 159-166, 2011 
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Basic design and implementation: As shown in Fig. 2, 
the agent runs a single controller and one replica 
manager for each back-end replica. The controller 
receives statements from clients and forwards them to 
the replica managers. Replica managers execute 
statements on their replicas and send answers back to 
the controller. The controller sends results back to the 
clients, compares query answers for agreement and 
determines when it is safe for transactions to commit. 
The controller may also decide to abort and retry 
transactions or initiate repair of faulty replicas. 
  In BFTR technique, one replica is designated to be 
primary and runs statements of the transactions slightly 
in advance to the other secondary replicas. The order in 
which the transactions are completed on the primary 
determines a serial order. BFTR ensures that all the 
non-faulty secondary’s commit transactions in an order 
equivalent to that at the primary. Furthermore, the agent 
achieves good performance by allowing queries to 
execute concurrently on the secondary’s where it 
observes the queries executing concurrently on the 
primary. When the primary is non-faulty, the system 
performs well. A faulty primary can cause performance 
to degrade but BFTR maintains correctness.      
  If a non-faulty database replica completes 
executing two statements without an intervening 
commit then the two statements do not conflict.  
  By using this property, the control try to extract 
concurrency information by observing the primary 
execute transactions: if the (non-faulty) primary allows 
a set of queries to run without conflicting, then the 
secondary’s can run these queries concurrently, or in 
any order, without yielding a different equivalent serial 
ordering from the primary. Execution schedules are 
generated by a faulty primary where conflicting 
statements execute concurrently.  
 
Notations used: Global commit delay counters-Dc, 
Query-q,   q‘s  delayer-qd, Commit-c0, Replica delayer-rd, 
Transaction-t, ABORT-ART, PR-Primary Replica, SR- 
Secondary Replica, PRM-Primary replica manager,   
SRM-Secondary replica manager, Query answer- qa, 
Acknowledge-ack and Client-cl. 
 
Commit delayer principle: We implement the 
commit-ordering and transaction-ordering rules using 
the commit delayer principle. The controller maintains 
a global commit delay counter, Dc and SRM maintains 
a replica delayer rd. 
  The following steps are involved in the commit 
delayer principle: 
1.  If the controller receives a response to query q 
from PR, then: 
qd = Dc 
2.  If the controller commits a transaction t, then: 
td = Dc 
3.  Dc = Dc+1 
4.  Send c0 to the replica managers. 
5.  While qd ≥ rd (SRM waits to send query q to SR)  
6.  If rd = td, then  
SRM commit transaction t 
7.  rd = rd+1  
8.  If SR has executed all queries of t  
It commits transaction t  
9.  rd = Dc  
 
  The following algorithms provide the steps for 
handling Byzantine faulty primary replicas. A failure of 
primary replica is indicated by returning a wrong 
answer and it is handled by detecting that the client 
received an incorrect answer at the transaction commit 
point and aborting the transaction. 
 
Algorithm for the controller: 
1. If controller receives q from cl. 
   1.1 Send q to PRM. 
 End  if 
2. If controller receives response for q from PRM, then 
  2.1 Send the response to cl. 
 2.2  qd← Dc 
  2.3 Record response as qa. 
  2.4 Send q to SRM. 
   End if 
3. If controller receives response for q from SRM, then 
   3.1 Add response to votes (q). 
   End if 
4. If controller receives ART from cl, then 
 4.1  Send  ART to RM. 
  4.2 Send ack to cl. 
 End  if 
5. If controller receive c0 for t from cl., then 
  5.1 While f+1 replica is ready to commit t 
  5.1.1 Delay processing c0  
   5.2 End While 
  5.3 If the response qa of cl does not contain f 
votes in votes (q), then 
 5.3.1  Send  ART to the RM  
  5.3.2 Inform cl of the ART. 
 5.4.  Else 
 5.4.1  td ← Dc;  
 5.4.2  Dc← Dc + 1. 
  5.4.3 Send ack to cl. 
  5.4.4 Send c0 to RM. 
   5.5 End if 
6. End if J. Computer Sci., 7 (2): 159-166, 2011 
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Algorithm for the SRM: 
1. For each query q in the collection, determine  
  1.1 All earlier queries from q’s transaction 
have completed processing. 
 1.2.  qd ≥ rd 
  1.3. Execute each query q that is ready on the 
replica  
  1.4. Send the result to the controller. 
 End  For 
2. If all queries of t have completed processing at SR 
and 
 r d = td, then  
  2.1 RM issue a c0 to the replica 
 End  if 
3. If c0 completes processing, then 
 r d= rd + 1 
 End  if 
4. for each ART for a transaction t in the collection,  
  4.1 discard any queries of t that have not yet 
been sent to the replica  
 End  For 
 
Fault recovery: 
Recovery of a crashed replica: 
 Step 1: The replica rejoins the system after recovery 
from offline. Transactions, which are not 
committed before the failure gets cancelled 
and these transactions must be repeated for 
updating the replica. Statements for recovering 
the replica are contained in the collection of 
the manager.  
Step 2:  When a database connection breaks, the replica 
manager considers that a replica had crashed. 
When the connection breaks, the manager 
sends a c0to the replica and when no reply is 
sent back to the manger, the knowledge of 
processing c0 before the replica went down 
can’t be known. The transaction cannot re-run, 
if it’s already committed.  
Step 3:  A transaction log table which consists of a row 
for each committed transaction with commit 
delayer for td, is added to each reply so that the 
replica manager determines the situation. The 
transaction log table contains an entry for the 
transactions committed before failure. The 
missing committed transactions can be re-run 
using the information from transaction log 
table. 
 
    If a connection gets re-established, the replica 
manger reads the table, compares the list of committed 
transactions with agent information and re-runs it. After 
processing all the committed transactions, the manger 
runs the in-progress transactions. 
 
Recovery from agent crash: 
Step 1: The log should be written prior so that crashes 
can be endured. When a controller determines 
that it can commit a transaction, it writes 
transaction queries along with the c0 to the log 
and the controller forces the log to disk before 
replying to the cl. After the replica’s 
transaction log table information is written, the 
log is also written to the disk and then the table 
is truncated.  
Step 2: Crash can be recovered by the agent. It reads 
the log and identifies all committed 
transactions and initializes the statement 
collections at the managers to contain the 
statements of these transactions. The replica’s 
transaction log table is examined by the 
controller and included in the replica manager’s 
collection. When the primary replica 
implements all the statements in the collection, 
new cl transactions are accepted by the agent.  
Step 3: The transaction information committed at all the 
replicas can be discarded so that the agents log 
can be shortened. Nearly all the replicas run 
properly so that there is no need of very large log. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
Simulation setup: Here we discuss about  the 
experimental performance evaluation of our algorithms 
through simulations. In order to test our protocol, the 
NS2 simulator (http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns)  is used. 
NS2 is a general-purpose simulation tool that provides 
discrete event simulation of user defined networks.  
  We have used the Bit Torrent packet-level 
simulator for P2P networks (Eger et al., 2007). The 
network topology is used only for the packet-level 
simulator. Based on the assumption that the bottleneck 
of the network is at the access links of the users and not 
at the routers, we use a simplified topology in our 
simulations. We model the network with the help of 
access and overlay links. Each peer is connected with 
an asymmetric link to its access router. All the access 
routers are connected directly to each other, 
modeling only an overlay link. This enables us to 
simulate different upload and download capacities as 
well as different end-to-end (e2e) delays between 
different peers. J. Computer Sci., 7 (2): 159-166, 2011 
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Fig. 3: No. of failures Vs Packet drop ratio 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: No. of failures Vs end-to-end delay 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: No. of failures Vs packets received 
 
Performance metrics: In our experiment, we measure 
the following metrics: 
•  Packet Drop Ratio: It is the ratio of number of 
dropped packets to the total number of packets sent 
•  Average end-to-end delay: The end-to-end-delay is 
averaged over all surviving data packets from the 
sources to the destinations 
•  Throughput: It is the number of packets received 
successfully 
•  Overhead: Routing and control overhead in terms 
of packets. 
 
Simulation results: We have compared our BFTR 
architecture to our previous QIRM architecture 
(Ayyasamy and Sivanandam, 2009) with no fault-
tolerant capabilities. In the experiment, we vary the 
number of failures of replicas as 1-4 and measure the 
above metrics. 
 
 
Fig. 6: No. of failures Vs overhead 
 
  Fig. 3 shows the packet drop ratio obtained with 
our BFTR technique compared with the QIRM 
technique. It shows that the packet drop ratio is 
significantly less than the default technique, when 
number of failures increases. Fig. 4 shows the end-to-
end delay occurred for the number of failures. It shows 
that the delay of BFTR is significantly less than the 
QIRM technique. 
  Fig. 5 shows the throughput occurred for various 
failures. As we can see from the figure, the throughput 
is more in the case of BFTR when compared to QIRM 
technique. 
  The communication overhead is represented in 
Fig. 6. It shows that the overhead is comparatively less 
for BFTR technique than the QIRM technique. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  In this study, we have developed a Byzantine 
Fault-Tolerance Replication (BFTR) technique for 
peer-to-peer content distribution systems which 
contains fault detection and fault recovery. Initially we 
have proposed a QoS based overlay network 
architecture involving an intelligent replica placement 
algorithm to improve the network utilization of the P2P 
system. In our BFTR technique, clients do not interact 
directly with the database replicas. Instead they 
communicate with the agent, which acts as a front-end 
to the replicas and controls them. The agent is 
replicated for increased fault tolerance. In this 
technique, one replica is designated to be the primary 
and runs statements of transactions slightly in advance 
to the other secondary replicas. The commit-ordering 
and transaction-ordering rules are implemented using 
the commit delayer principle which ensures correctness 
while handling the faulty primary replica. By 
simulation results, we have shown that the proposed 
technique involves less overhead and recovery time 
with increased accuracy. J. Computer Sci., 7 (2): 159-166, 2011 
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